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Highlights
• Our study of hydropower regimes in European countries reveals the consid-
erably variable terms of hydropower usage rights, in both their joint obliga-
tions and the degree of openness of the competition processes through which 
these rights are granted. 
• The environmental and economic stakes and liabilities associated with the 
use of hydropower account for the in-depth public controls in granting these 
rights. Nevertheless, the strong differences among hydropower regimes in 
Europe cannot be explained by rational environmental or economic criteria 
while they bring competition distortion to the common European electricity 
market. 
• Over the last decade, the European Commission has opened several infringe-
ment procedures to prompt the implementation of competitive processes. 
However, unfortunately, this has not been undertaken with a common ‘Euro-
pean’ approach, which would ensure similar efforts throughout Member 
States to open the competition process to access hydropower. The current 
discrepancies among Member States create obstacles for countries engaged in 
a competitive renewal process, as there is not a level playing field or a coher-
ent European reference framework.
• Thus, the heterogeneous state of European hydropower regimes requires 
significant efforts from the European Commission, and the institutional 
stakeholders, to stimulate harmonisation. It would help if the Commission 
Directorates-General started debating the topic and coordinating their action. 
New, clear steps must be taken to prepare national and regional authorities to 
harmonise their rules of attribution and to mitigate competition distortions.
1.  is policy brief summarises the reasoning and the results of the FSR research report: “Regimes 
for granting right to use hydropower in Europe” (2015).
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Background 
 e characteristics of hydropower make it a prominent energy 
source in liberalised electricity systems. Hydropower provides 
widespread bene ts to the entire power supply chain. It can be a 
substitute for any other generation technology (either baseload, 
mid-merit or peak power plants). Furthermore, hydro storage 
(with or without pumping) plays a major role in balancing the 
system, because of the  exibility it provides, which is all the 
more useful to the system if intermittent generation is to be 
integrated. Hydropower also has the advantage of being emis-
sion-free while generating electricity. Moreover, considering its 
concentrated location in Europe - in the Alps, the Pyrenees, in 
Scandinavia, etc. - it also signi cantly impacts on the network 
interconnection exchanges between the European countries. 
However, hydropower, in particular, is a generation technology 
which has a considerable e ect on its local environment. It can 
impact other water or land uses (tourism, agriculture, aqua-
culture, etc.), or even remote aquatic life. It can also produce 
greenhouse gases from the decomposition of speci c  ooded 
land (up to 0.25 tCO2e/MWh in the lifespan of the power plant, 
compared to 1 tCO2e/MWh for a gas turbine).  e liabilities of 
hydropower usage may be far-reaching.  erefore, the bene ts 
of hydropower for the entire power system should be weighed 
against its potentially negative environmental impact. 
 is arbitrage accounts for the in-depth public controls 
observed in granting the rights to use hydropower, install a 
power turbine, and possibly build a water reservoir for the pur-
pose of energy storage.
Public controls of the use of hydropower are usually realised at 
the national, regional or local level, through regulators or local 
authorities.  is multiplicity of stakeholders is even greater 
at a European level, which exposes the huge disparity in the 
type of rights, the way they are attributed and maintained, and 
the joint (environmental or investment) obligations that these 
rights encompass.  is diversity may, in turn, create variable 
incentives to use and develop hydropower facilities across 
European countries and regions. Accordingly, this may lead to 
serious distortions of the national energy markets, as well as 
the European electricity market, as a whole. 
 erefore, understanding and grasping the main di er-
ences between the national or regional hydropower regimes 
throughout Europe is of particular interest. As it stands, the 
economic literature and general knowledge on hydropower 
remains national in scope. As of yet, no benchmarking of 
the di erent European hydropower regimes has been carried 
out, which complicates the study of potential market distor-
tions. Consequently, we address this de ciency by comparing 
the hydropower regimes of European countries with large 
hydropower capacity, or potential capacity, focusing mainly 
on Western countries, namely Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, 
France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Except for Switzer-
land, Greece, Bulgaria and Poland, the energy systems in these 
countries are already connected through a common regional 
market, which accounts for 85% of the EU electricity genera-
tion.  is common market is expected to expand and include 
all the European countries in the near future. 
In this document, we analyse and compare the characteristics 
of these 14 hydropower regulatory regimes, to identify their 
key economic properties. We then study the action of Euro-
pean institutions, with regard to hydropower regimes and pos-
sible distortions, and we open a discussion toward the need for 
more harmonisation at a Europe-wide scale. 
A three-faceted framework to study 
hydropower regimes
A uni ed analytical framework is needed to describe, scruti-
nise and compare national hydropower regimes, on an equal 
basis. Robust recommendations could not otherwise be formu-
lated at a Europe-wide scale. 
 e characteristics of hydropower regimes can be described 
through three main facets: (i) the institutional enforcement of 
hydropower regimes, (ii) the process of granting rights to use 
hydropower and the enforcement of these rights, (iii) the joint 
obligations that hydropower operators must respect. 
Facet #1 Institutional enforcement
 e institutional enforcement of hydropower regimes details the 
regulation and application of hydropower regimes by regulators 
and other authorities. In particular, it considers the repartition 
of various stakeholders in designing hydropower regimes and 
granting rights for its usage.  ese stakeholders can be varied, 
from municipalities or regulatory authorities, through to envi-
ronmental authorities and national or regional governments. 
Studying the di erences between each regime, at that level, gives 
clear indications of the degree of heterogeneity between regimes. 
 e institutional framework also describes the type of rights, 
authorisations, licences, permits or concessions, which deter-
mine the applicable set of laws and regulations of hydropower 
usage.  e de nition of these  rights might have an economic 
impact through the relevant legal limitations.
Facet #2 Process of granting rights to use hydropower 
and enforcement of these rights
Another facet of the hydropower regime regards the character-
istics related to the granting and enforcement of the rights to 
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use hydropower. It  rst regards the duration of the right.  e 
di erent local or national public authorities can grant it for 
variable durations, for one or several decades, with more or less 
time for hydropower operators to pay back their investment. 
 ese rights can be granted or renewed through negotiation 
between the applicant and the public authority, or through a 
competitive process. In this regard, it will be necessary to dis-
tinguish, among the European countries, those which have 
been under the scrutiny of an infringement procedure from the 
European Commission (or the EFTA2 Surveillance Authority 
with respect to the EFTA States).
Facet #3 Obligations of hydropower operators
 e last main facet of hydropower regimes regards the joint 
obligations that hydropower right holders must respect. 
Besides technological speci cation, hydropower usage rights 
generally include strict environmental,  nancial or contractual 
conditions, which are associated with both the environmental 
impact of hydropower plants, as well as the strategic economic 
and  nancial bene ts associated with the technology. 
 e right to use hydropower generally speci es one, or sev-
eral, authorised types of power plant: run-of-the-river (letting 
the water  ow without a dam), or a reservoir dam. It can also 
include criteria on size, waterfall characteristics or the instal-
lation of a pump (to pump water downstream from the water-
course when the electricity price is low, store it in a reservoir 
and use it when the energy will be more valuable).
Some restrictions of use (minimum or maximum water  ow 
use) may also be attached to the usage right.  ese restrictions 
can concern the share of water utilisation with other activi-
ties, such as with tourism installations,  sheries, or they can be 
based on ecological ( shway, sediment  ow) or security reasons 
(to avoid spilled water that may create  ooding downstream).
 e right of use can also encompass investment obligations 
for environmental protection (e.g.,  sh ladders - to help  sh 
go upstream, aerating turbines or multi-layer intakes to avoid 
a decrease in the temperature and oxygen concentration in the 
reservoir, etc.). 
Most o en, it also includes the payment of royalties or speci c 
taxes (based on its electrical power, ground coverage, water use 
or the amount of electricity produced or stored, the generated 
revenues, etc.).  ese conditions are based on the objective of 
national and local authorities to share the (o en signi cant) 
rent of hydropower use with the rest of the region or country. 
2.  e European Free Trade Association is a free trade organization be-
tween Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland that operates in 
parallel with, and is linked to, the European Union.
Diversity of national hydropower regimes
In this section, without being exhaustive, we present, in 5  g-
ures, some characteristics that make the hydropower regimes 
of the 14 studied European countries (namely Austria, Bul-
garia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland) 
very singular. 
Figure 1 presents the degree to which hydropower rights are 
granted by local or regional authorities, depending on the size 
of the power plant.
Figure 1. Decision-making power of local authorities 
One can observe the wide range of decision-making power for 
local authorities. In some countries, like Great Britain, Finland 
or Norway, all rights are granted by a single national authority, 
whatever the location or size of the hydropower plant. In 
other countries, such as Portugal, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, 
Sweden, Poland, Bulgaria or Greece, the rights to use hydro-
power are granted by regional or even local authorities.  is 
may add local diversity to national di erences on the method 
of granting the right to use hydropower, and their associated 
obligations.
Figures 2 and 3 focus on the speci cation of the rights to use 
hydropower. Figure 2 presents the various types of usage rights 
(authorisation, concession, licence, and permit) and their dura-
tion, which goes from 12 years in Great Britain (with, never-
theless, the possibility of in nite renewal), to up to 80 years 
in Switzerland, with the most extreme case being Sweden and 
Finland, with no time limit. 
If the economic impact of observing di erent types of rights 
to use hydropower is unclear, the variability of its duration has 
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two main implications. First of all, the incentive for investment 
is all the more powerful if the duration of the right is long, as 
hydropower operators are then able to cover their investment 
costs over a longer period. A compensation scheme could oth-
erwise be planned, and correctly valued, at the termination 
of the right, to achieve the same incentive e ect. Meanwhile, 
a longer right duration reduces competition for hydropower 
access, which means the opportunity for potential new entrants 
arises less frequently. Di erent duration times thus imply dif-
ferent investment incentives and opportunities for new entrants 
to challenge incumbents. 
Figure 2.  e forms of rights to use hydropower
Figure 3 represents an overview of the environmental obliga-
tions, provided by the di erent hydropower regimes, with 
details on the various thresholds and areas where an environ-
mental impact assessment is required, and the necessary min-
imum residual  ow. An environmental impact assessment can 
be mandatory for all power plants (as in Bulgaria, Poland or 
Sweden) or for the biggest ones (as in Norway, Austria, Italy 
and Portugal). It can also only be applied in environmentally 
sensitive areas, and when the e ects on health and the environ-
ment are most likely (in Great Britain, Greece, Finland, France 
and Italy). Minimum residual  ows are also very variable from 
one country to another, from non-zero in Germany, or 5% in 
Great Britain, to more than 12 % in France. 
From an economic point of view, such di erences in the envi-
ronmental impact assessment and residual  ow requirements 
can lead to di erences in investment costs for hydropower 
facilities, other things being equal. Indeed, the environmental 
obligations imply either an increase in investment costs for a 
maximal exploitation of hydropower potential, or a reduction 
of the plant capacity. Given the economies of scale of hydro-
power facilities, such a solution would lead to lower pro t-
ability of the plant. 
Figure 3. Environmental impact assessment and residual  ow 
obligations
Figure 4 illustrates whether the rights to use hydropower are 
attributed or renewed through a competitive process. 
France, Spain and Italy currently grant or renew the right to use 
hydropower through a competitive process. Great Britain does 
the same for licences granted a er 2003, the licences granted 
before 2003 having no time limit. A competition process for 
new power plants is only implemented in Portugal and Swit-
zerland.  e other studied countries, Norway, Sweden, Fin-
land, Germany, Austria, Poland, Bulgaria and Greece had not 
implemented any competitive process to grant the right to use 
hydropower, until recently. Obviously, the implementation of a 
competitive process to grant or renew the right to use hydro-
power provides opportunities for new entrants to access this 
resource and these national markets.
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Figure 4. Process of competition to grant the right to use 
hydropower
It must be noted that the way these rights are attributed evolved 
some years ago in France, Italy and Spain, a er they were tar-
geted by infringement procedures from the DG internal market 
and services, as recently seen with Austria (see  gure 5). Five 
other infringement procedures have also been initiated by dif-
ferent Directorates-General.  e DG Competition has opened 
a State aid procedure in Portugal, questioning the price paid by 
the incumbent to extend the duration of its concession rights. 
And, the DG Environment opened an infringement procedure 
in Austria, Germany, Poland and Spain for not respecting the 
water directive in planning a new hydropower plant.
An infringement procedure was also opened against Norway 
by the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA), in 20023.  is was 
due to discrimination between public and private companies, 
as the latter were not compensated at the termination of their 
right to use hydropower, while retroceding their asset to the 
pubic authority.  e ESA decision of 2007 allowed Norway 
the right to legitimately pursue the objective of establishing a 
system of public ownership of all expiring rights.  ere has not 
been any major change in the other countries.
3. EFTA Court (2007), Case E-2/06, EFTA Surveillance Authority v.  e 
Kingdom of Norway, Judgment of the Court: Conditions for concession 
acquisition of hydropower resources, http://www.e acourt.int/uploads/
tx_nvcases/2_06_Judgment_EN.pdf. 
Figure 5. Several countries have been subject to an infringe-
ment procedure
Possible distortion of the European 
electricity market
 e di erences in hydropower rights regimes, observed in 
Western European countries, are currently not established on 
a commonly de ned basis. Rather, they are decided by the dif-
ferent national or local authorities.  e speci cation of each 
national or local regime, the obligations faced by hydropower 
operators, and the characteristics of the granting process (com-
petitive or not) present no uniformity in any scope greater than 
the national level. Some of these di erences could be justi ed 
from an economic point of view, e.g. those based on environ-
mental speci cation. However, it is not possible to decisively 
conclude whether these di erences are justi ed from an eco-
nomic point of view, and thus whether they introduce competi-
tion distortion. 
Such distortions can in uence both investment conditions 
and the use of power plants. Other things being equal, if one 
country provides better or worse conditions for investment and 
use of hydropower (through more or less obligations, taxation 
or competition), it will distort the national power equilibrium, 
the electricity price in each country, and the electricity  ow pat-
tern through the power grid, compared to a situation in which 
the national hydropower regimes would be built according to a 
common methodology.4
4. Even if it is not illustrated here, diversity of taxation is also important, 
which introduces additional distortion to the European electricity mar-
ket.
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Lack of clarity from the di erent 
European Commission DGs, and the need 
for greater harmonisation of hydropower 
regimes
Not referring to a well-de ned analysis of the right to use 
hydropower, the European Commission follows a case-by-case 
approach in each of its several DGs.  e infringement proce-
dures it opened follow this path. Each DG acts independently 
on its own infringement cases, with its own objectives, using 
di erent, uncoordinated tools. As of today, fortunately, no 
country has yet been simultaneously targeted for its hydro-
power regime by several DGs. Several strong contradictions in 
DGs’ approaches are nevertheless observed. DG Competition 
has targeted Portugal for State aid, but DG Internal Market and 
Services has raised no question about the absence of a com-
petitive process for the renewal of rights to use hydropower. 
Similarly, DG Environment has opened an infringement proce-
dure against Austria for non-compliance with the water direc-
tive while DG Internal Market and Services has opened none, 
whereas no competitive process has been implemented. Fur-
thermore, decisions made by DG Internal Market and Services 
seem to lack uniformity. While the EC reopened an infringe-
ment procedure against Italy, due to a newly added delay to the 
Italian law on opening the hydropower market, other countries 
like Austria, Germany or Sweden have not been questioned, 
despite rights to hydropower being granted without any com-
petitive procedures, sometimes for very long periods (see box 
1).  ese examples show a regrettable lack of coordination and 
consistency of the European Commission DGs. It might lead 
to additional and contradictory distortions of competition, and 
make it more di  cult to open competition for hydropower in 
other countries. 
 e time has come for the European Commission to stop the 
case-by-case and DG-by-DG approach.  e Commission has 
to start a complete and thorough analysis, and should work 
on coherent economic recommendations for designing and 
granting the rights to use hydropower.  e action and policy of 
the various DGs acting on the EU hydropower regime should 
be coordinated and their tools and approaches harmonised. 
At a global level, the goals of the Commission DGs should be 
to deliver a harmonised regulatory regime for hydropower. 
Our study of the European national regimes has exposed 
serious issues that go beyond the legitimate variability of com-
petition procedures.  e many di erences observed from one 
national or regional regime to another exacerbate the distor-
tions of competition between Member States, and jeopardise 
the achievements of the common energy market. New and 
harmonised rules regarding the implementation of rights and 
joint obligations are an urgent matter that the EC should treat 
alongside its e orts to develop and regularise the competitive 
processes for hydropower rights. 
It is time for the EU to start implementing its new “Energy 
Union” policy strategy approach: to stop “silo” thinking and 
fragmented action; to move forward with one mind and a 
single voice across all Commission DGs. 
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Box 1 National situations versus currently engaged procedures for competitive infringement
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Complete information on our activities can be found online at:  fsr.eui.eu
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